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From ‘Shock and Awe’ to ‘Hearts
and Minds’: the fall and rise of US
counterinsurgency capability in Iraq
KALEV I SEPP
ABSTRACT This article recounts the initial difficulties of the US occupation of
Iraq that enabled the growth and maturation of the Iraqi insurgency. The focus
will be on how the US military adapted, while in combat, to a situation for
which its prior training and doctrinal focus had left it ill prepared. The article
will explain the challenges faced by military leaders to move from a
hierarchical, cold war-designed approach to warfare, to a more adaptive,
decentralised mode of operations that requires distributed authority and
decision making. The story will be told from the perspective of two strategic
planners who helped shape the campaign plan for the coalition forces in Iraq,
including the challenges they encountered when attempting to unify all elements
of US national power against the Iraqi insurgency.
It was going to be the first war won by the new doctrine of ‘Rapid
Dominance’, delivering devastating firepower to ‘shock and awe’ the
government and people of an entire nation-state into submission within
days. Late on the evening of 19 March 2003, unsleeping video cameras
caught the thunderous beginning of the aerial bombardment of Baghdad by
Anglo-American warplanes and missiles. Yet, when the capital fell to allied
troops barely two weeks later, their military commanders found none of the
paralysis promised by the author of the theory of ‘shock and awe’, defence
industry consultant Harlan Ullman.1 Instead, vicious surprise attacks by
bands of Saddamist guerrillas hindered the advance of fighting units and
crippled the truck-borne flow of supplies into Iraq. These fanatical assaults
were the harbingers of the long insurgent war that the same invading troops
are struggling against four years on.2 Yet the war has changed markedly, and
much of the US Army and Marine Corps with it. Few officers still advocate
bombing and shelling the enemies they encounter as a matter of course. They
and their soldiers and marines now seek to convince the Iraqi people to
support the newly elected government and its policies. To achieve this,
the invaders-turned-occupation-troops have had to try to gain the respect of
the mass of ordinary Iraqi citizens—to win both their ‘hearts and minds’.
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The change in the manner and intent of military operations in Iraq is so
fundamental that general officers wonder aloud if the lieutenants and
captains, on whom they rely to fight battles, are now experts in counter-
insurgency. And, thus, are no longer capable of the conventional World War
II-style combat, which is still the preferred ‘American Way of War’.3
The ‘American Way of War’ meets Iraqi reality
This shift in war-fighting philosophy, away from ‘seeking and destroying’
foes to an embrace of the population as the critical objective in modern
conflict, has been slow and exceedingly incomplete. However, because it is the
only approach military forces can take with any reasonable hope of success in
Iraq, it must be pursued. It has taken three hard years of give-and-take
clashes and bitter losses to mines and ambushes to bring the Army and
Marine Corps to where they now comprehend the character of the war they
fight. Since academics at the various war colleges and military service schools
teach that understanding is essential at the beginning of a war, there is due
concern that this knowledge may have come too late. This failure has fuelled
the insurgency and extended it, and may be judged one day to have
contributed to its success and to the US-led coalition’s failure. It is worth
considering why it took these three irrecoverable years for the US military to
move away from the doctrine of ‘shock and awe’, to begin seeking to convert
‘hearts and minds’ to their cause.
After April 2003 the US military lost the initiative it had gained in the
invasion phase. The arrival of General George Casey and his staff a year later
to replace Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez and his understaffed
headquarters energised the military effort. Nevertheless, General Casey’s
Multi-National Force – Iraq is still catching up with the many opponents they
now face. The insurgency was a huge challenge to the US military—not just
to its unarmoured troop-carrying vehicles, but also to its mindset about how
to fight a war. As Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld admonished, ‘You
go to war with the Army you have. They’re not the Army you might want or
wish to have at a later time.’4 The military organisation he directed in 2003
was optimal and optimised for conventional warfare. Its leaders expected to
fight a short, sharp battle in Iraq and quickly return home. The invasion was
well executed but, as is widely agreed, its aftermath was not.5
The US military, as an institution, was not prepared to fight more than one
kind of war. Some individuals ‘got it’, as per the popular phrase denoting due
understanding of a situation, but the institution did not. Tactically the
sergeants, lieutenants and captains tended to adapt quickly and well. Among
those senior officers who appreciated the character of post-invasion Iraq was
then-Major General Pete Chiarelli, who prepared himself and his division for
the urban battleground of Baghdad by visiting Texas cities to learn how their
governments and services functioned. While successfully restarting the
economy of northern Iraq, then Major General Dave Petraeus used the
metaphor ‘money is ammunition’ to encourage his officers’ use of emergency
relief funds to get Iraqis back to work on recovery projects.6 The phrase
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itself, however, revealed the degree to which his officers and soldiers had
believed that firepower was the solution to all problems.
There were also commanders with a more traditional, or classic,
perspective. During 2004 then Major General Ray Odierno commanded
the US division in Baghdad. He recalled that he took as his primary mission
the protection of his own troops. It is a noble sentiment and an admirable
goal, true to the values of American officers. However, it placed the welfare
of his soldiers absolutely above that of the Iraqi people, who expected the
Americans to provide for their security, as the Iraqi army and police could
not. It would be as if police in the USA shot anyone who threatened them, or
seemed to threaten them, or seemed to be capable of threatening them, as
they patrolled the highways and byways of the USA and its vast urban
conglomerations. This inward logic led Major General Odierno to order
mass arrests of hundreds of civilians when pursuing a few insurgents,
enraging and embittering formerly friendly or neutral Iraqis caught in these
sweeps. He eventually gave the order to his troops to ‘increase lethality’ in
their operations. His top priority in counterinsurgency, he said, was to obtain
the best possible weapons and equipment for his soldiers—to help protect
them from the threats they faced.7 How this type of mission-focus might help
Iraq become a functional and viable nation-state, however, is far from clear.
What it does reflect is how military staff schools and war colleges trained
senior commanders after Vietnam. In the post-Vietnam era commanders
were encouraged to view their assigned terrain not as towns and farms with
populations and property to secure, but as a battlefield, devoid of civilians,
where firepower could be brought to bear on an opposing army without
hesitation.8
In Iraq the objectives of the USA are fundamentally political. Secretary of
Defense Donald Rumsfeld declared in November 2006, just before his
resignation, that in Iraq: ‘the problem is not a military problem. In fact, the
reality is that it’s a political governance problem, and it’s a governmental
problem, and it’s a problem of reconciliation.’9 Referring to the Iraqi
Security Forces, defence analyst Tom Donnelly said: ‘There isn’t yet an Iraq
to defend. . .A nation, as well as an army, needs to be stood up.’10 The
attainment of these objectives is at least as dependent on the success of civic
action and economic development as they are on any military force. The slow
advance of civic improvement has delayed the termination of violence and
undermined any dissipation of the insurgency. Military support of civic
programmes is essential, as no other agency has the material resources,
numbers, and quality of personnel and wherewithal to implement these
critical programmes in the austere and hostile environment of an armed
insurgency.
In the foreign policy toolbox the US military wields a sledgehammer, at
the same time as the US State Department holds a jeweller’s screwdriver. The
State Department only controls $30 billion in annual foreign assistance, the
same amount spent in a single month by the Department of Defense in Iraq.
The US military will not receive help from the State Department. The State
Department will not fundamentally change, despite recent positive initiatives
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to increase the presence of its Foreign Service corps outside embassies
overseas. The organisation, manning, budgeting, direction and leadership of
an effective full-blooded civil –military operation to achieve US objectives in
Iraq have not been formalised. The US military must have this ready capacity
in order to be able to meet whatever requirements and goals the White House
and the Congress set for them. For three decades after the end of the Vietnam
war, ‘irregular’ warfare was a bad word in the US military, equating to
‘abnormal’. Irregular warfare is now regular—it is the norm for combat in
the new century.11
Three years into the battle for Iraq, there are unsettling signs that the US
Army’s adaptation to small wars is uneven. Two concurrent and contrasting
stories from the war zone illustrate this. In February 2006 Tom Lasseter of
the Knight-Ridder news organisation, embedded with the 101st Airborne
Division, reported a telling incident in the contested town of Samarra.
Elements of the division’s 187th Infantry Regiment, known by their
nickname the ‘Rakkasans’, were based in a concrete-walled fortress in the
centre of town. The official designation of the outpost was Patrol Base
Uvannie, but the besieged troops there called it ‘The Alamo’. Lasseter
witnessed an American soldier manning a heavy machine gun shoot and kill
an unarmed Iraqi man because he walked into an ‘exclusion zone’—
which the troops called a ‘kill zone’—that extended 100 yards out from
the concrete barrier walls of the base. As the Iraqi lay dying with a 50-calibre
bullet wound through his body, he pointed at a little building in front of
him and said in broken English, to the US medics who rushed to his side,
helpless to save him: ‘This is my house’. He had simply been walking
home. The colonel commanding the regiment had sternly declared, ‘The
Rakkasans don’t do warning shots’. The late-arriving lieutenant on the scene
fully understood that killing the Iraqi man, in a society where honour and
revenge are paramount created 15 new insurgents. The soldier who killed the
Iraqi civilian railed to the reporter that he didn’t understand why he was in
Iraq.12
At the same time, also in the conflictive west of Iraq, another journalist
reported a story on another regiment, but with a very different cast. In a
series of feature articles, the Washington Post’s Tom Ricks described the
operations of the Third Armored Cavalry Regiment in Tall Afar, and the
relative success of the Americans’ efforts there. He noted that, months before
the unit left the USA, the regimental commander conducted a long and
comprehensive intellectual preparation of his troops for this kind of war, not
just tactical training. His officers and sergeants made their way through
extensive reading lists. They studied and discussed historical cases of counter-
insurgencies, focusing on subjects like population security and control. Once
in Iraq, they planned their operations in conjunction with the Iraqi security
forces. In the battle for Tall Afar the Iraqis accepted their share of
responsibility for clearing the city, and in the end suffered more casualties
than the Americans. The regimental commander received a letter of thanks
from the mayor praising his troops for ridding the town of insurgents—but
more, for helping re-establish the municipal government, resolving political
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disputes and developing the police and public services. The mayor called the
cavalrymen ‘Lionhearts’, which is the stuff of martial legend.13
This marked contrast between two regiments of the same army shouldn’t
exist. Yet, as late as December 2005, a US Army brigade commander arriving
in Iraq admitted he had only learned his unit’s primary mission—to train
Iraqi security forces—as his troops were moving into their sector of
responsibility.14 Why are army units and leaders sometimes so baffled by
their tasks in a counterinsurgency war? In part there is a fundamental mis-
statement of their overarching mission in Iraq. The Defense Department’s
strategic plan in 2006 highlights the future mission of ‘stability operations’.
This infers that in present and future wars the US military will be working to
restore a country in conflict, or in a post-conflict situation, to its pre-conflict
‘status quo’. But US national policy intends that almost everything in Iraq
will be wholly different than before. Thus, the USA, its embassy and its
armed forces are not trying to stabilise Iraq. They are, rather, fundamentally
destabilising an entire country and everything in it.
The presence of uninvited foreign military troops in any country is by itself
destabilising. Simultaneously a new government is to be instituted—a
Stalinist dictatorship will be replaced by a representative democracy that is
still responsive to tribal and religious structures. There will be a new
economy: the previous Marxist-style command economy, with its oil-funded
welfare programmes, will be replaced by free-market capitalism. A new
media environment with a free press and freedom of expression will succeed
the censored state-controlled propaganda machine run by Saddam Hussein.
Iraqis will have a new security system—the Iraqi Gestapo of Saddam’s
regime will be replaced with an uniformed civil police force, chartered to
protect rather than terrorise the citizenry. Iraq will have a new diplomatic
standing, and new relations with Turkey, Syria, Iran, Israel, the USA and the
rest of the world. Very significantly a new society is in the making. Iraq will
no longer be dominated by the Sunnis, but instead ethnically and politically
federated, with a strong Shi’ia—and hence Iranian—influence.
From conventional war to security and development in Iraq?
Is it really possible for the US Army to undertake this work, now and in the
future? This misdirection of the US military’s effort is possibly the result of
a fundamental mis-statement of its mission. As mentioned above, the
Defense Department’s 2006 strategic plan highlights the future mission of
‘stability operations’, implying that US armed forces will be working to
restore a country in conflict, or in a post-conflict situation, to its pre-conflict
‘status quo’. Conflict and instability are associated with insurgents and
guerrilla fighters, but upholding the old order in any given nation may be
contrary to what is necessary to undermine and eliminate the insurgency
threatening it.
Call it militant Wilsonianism, call it expeditionary democracy, call it
counterinsurgency, but this is not ‘return to status quo’, and it is decidedly not
stabilising. It is an overturning of nations. It is, at its core, a revolution.
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American soldiers are the instruments of this revolution, and its implementers
as well. The army would have to lead revolutions on a scale so vast as to
completely eclipse what the USA experienced in breaking fromGreat Britain’s
imperial rule, or in reconstructing the defeated slave states of the South
following the American Civil War. The US Armed Forces, and the US Army
in particular must shoulder the burden of these tremendous tasks because
there is simply no other agency or department in the US government that can
do the job.
The widely varied and distributed character of the insurgency in Iraq
hindered an intellectual grasp of the situation for many leaders. It is a
patchwork or mosaic conflict, whatMarine General Charles Krulak described
as a ‘three-block war’. On three contiguous city blocks, he suggested, one
could simultaneously find humanitarian aid being distributed, a civil
disturbance being quelled, and all-out combat being fought.15 Regarding
the subject of insurgency itself, there was considerable interest, research and
writing on insurgency and counterinsurgency in the 1960s. However, so much
of the global political structure has changed, that it is not possible simply to
reapply 1960s theories and doctrines to the present uprising in Iraq.
The insurgents in particular have changed dramatically. During the Cold
War most insurgent groups’ objective was to seize power, directly and
plainly. Now it is more likely that these organisations will attempt to act as
‘spoilers’. For example, in Iraq the numerous resistance groups, while not
necessarily operating in collusion with one another, are nonetheless making
important portions of the country ungovernable. Insurgents used to rely on
logistical support from the local population where they operated (this was
Mao Zedong’s approach to guerrilla warfare, necessitated by the remoteness
of the regions of China where he battled the Japanese and the Kuomintang).
Now they exploit the internet to manage their finances, which are provided
from sympathisers around the world. Insurgency expert Tom Marks explains
that last century’s insurgents used terror as a tactic—a ‘method of action’.
This century’s insurgents employ terror as a ‘logic of action’, believing the use
of terror to be self-justifying. In their effort to tear down the existing global
political system, terror is its own rationale.16
American military strategic culture has retarded the transition of military
operations from conventional to unconventional warfare. The strategist
Jeffrey Record notes that, especially since the First World War, the leaders of
US armed forces have revealed a consistent pattern of behaviour. They are
predisposed to be: 1) apolitical, reflecting an ethic of subordination to civilian
political authority; 2) a-strategic, focused on winning battles and campaigns,
not on winning wars; and 3) ahistorical, extending from a misplaced belief
that new situations render the study of history unnecessary, beyond regard
for sentimental historical touchstones and tactical vignettes extolling the
central martial value of courage under fire.17
In actuality American military culture is grounded in the simple principals
of firepower and mass. Mirroring both strengths and a notable weakness of
the broader American society, its military forces are highly reliant on
technology and logistics, and generally ignorant of cultures beyond their
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borders. There is a profound desire in war to ‘do it fast, do it alone’. In
expeditionary warfare in particular, allies have tended to be viewed by US
staffs as minor contingents, less well-equipped and something of a burden
imposed on them by political leaders, impeding efficient and rapid execution
of the assigned military objective. A serving four-star general wrote at the
conclusion of the 1991 Gulf war that it was ‘the first coalition war the United
States has fought since the Second World War’.18 This recollection was
wholly ignorant of reality, no matter how one chose to interpret the term
‘coalition’, and showed evidence of a dismissive attitude towards non-
American units. It was striking that the writer was a two time veteran of the
Vietnam war, where the US forces assisted the larger South Vietnamese
military. Further, his senior commanders and ranking sergeants in Vietnam
were veterans of the Korean war, where Americans fought alongside not only
the sizeable South Korean army but numerous United Nations units as well.
The Iraq war has pointedly shown that the value of allies in a counter-
insurgency linked to global terrorist movements cannot be underestimated or
overstated.
For the USA the most important alliance in Iraq is with the Iraqis
themselves. The attainment of US policy objectives is almost wholly
dependent on the Iraqis—without their direct engagement and help, the
USA alone cannot create the conditions for success. It follows, then, that a
military doctrine of ‘shock and awe’ on the scale that Ullman claimed was
necessary to debilitate Iraq, would also make the Iraqi state incapable of
recovering from the widespread physical destruction and slaughter that
would accompany such a massive attack. The real examples of this are post-
Second World War Germany and Japan, which suffered through an extended
version of ‘shock and awe’ because the technical means of pinpoint delivery
of explosives now available was lacking to the Allies. Instead, it took three
years of constant aerial carpet-bombing for the British and Americans to
achieve the devastation required to compel the diminishing populations of
those nation-states to capitulate (not forgetting their conquest by the huge
Russian and Anglo-American ground armies). Afterwards they lived amid
ruins for over two years before the faintest beginnings of an economic
rebuilding could be managed—and that was only enabled with the largest
foreign aid offering ever made by the USA.19
As the situation has clarified, is it now possible to predict the future in
Iraq? The central concerns are about the anticipated length of the current
conflict, and how much it will cost the USA to see it through. Proposals have
been forwarded recommending that US interests can be served by variously
withdrawing all US troops into large fortified bases, where they could eat 31
flavours of ice cream and guard only their own perimeter. It is unclear how
the imagined threat of force represented by the simple presence of combat
units confined to these isolated bases—‘self-administering prisoner-of-war
camps’, as defense analyst Terry Daly calls them—would support the
attainment of US policy goals.20 Another proposal is to withdraw all combat
troops completely, and only commit a small number of military advisers to
aid the Iraqi security forces.21
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Leaving the Iraqi security forces in an immature and vulnerable stage of
their development opens the possibility of a ‘worst case scenario’—a repeat of
the Mosul police mass desertions, or the collapse of elements of the Iraqi
Army in Al Anbar province, potentially on a larger scale. The resulting chaos
could invite intervention by neighbouring nation-states to advance their
interests in Iraq and the region. The outcomes might be the balkanisation of
Iraq, or the emergence of a new Iraqi strongman in the mould of Saddam
Hussein, or a combination of these undesirable conclusions. In any case, if
the flow of oil to global markets is threatened, military action may be
unavoidable. It is not beyond the realm of the possible that the USA could
find itself in the position of leading another invasion of Iraq within a decade
of the first to make right what was allowed to go wrong for the sake of
expedience.
The other option is to be patient and progressive. As with other counter-
insurgencies, this campaign will evolve over time, will not be quick and will
demand patience. However, it can be successful. The insurgency cannot
continue at its current level of violence indefinitely. If the US-led coalition
takes the steps to unify its security operations with those of governance and
economic development, the population, upon which the insurgents depend,
will see progress and increasingly withdraw support from or even oppose the
insurgents. The Iraqi armed forces and police are growing in size and
capability, despite insurgent attacks and terrorism. Several major cities are
now in Iraqi hands and more will return to Iraqi government control in the
future, and US and British commanders at all levels believe that more Iraqi
units will be able to take charge of their assigned zones within a year or two.
Daily combat operations by US and coalition forces are absolutely critical
to progress in these sectors. Without their presence, at this moment when the
new nation-state is most vulnerable, the insurgents would certainly triumph,
plunging Iraq into civil war and the region into chaos. The nascent Iraqi
security forces—both the army and the police—openly admit to their need for
broad assistance to protect the Iraqi people from the insurgents and their tacit
collaborators, armed and organised criminals. To determine the practicality
of these options, and all the other suggestions of courses of action, the nature
of the war in Iraq must be examined to determine how the war has changed
over time—and whether the US military has changed with it.
There has been an epistemological debate over the meaning of ‘insurgency’
and ‘civil war’, presented as separate and distinct forms of conflict and
implying that one is fought in some very separate way from the other. The
US military’s own Joint Publication 1 – 02 spells out their definitions, and
reveals only the most subtle of differences. An insurgency, this military
dictionary says, is an organised movement aimed at overthrowing a central
or regional government, or forcing a change in policies, through subversion
and violence. A civil war is a violent conflict within a country, fought by
organised groups that aim to take power at the centre or in a region, or to
change government policies.22 The scholar of civil wars, James Fearon, posits




From the Weinberger –Powell Doctrine to Rapid Dominance and beyond
The USA will continue to use force—contrary to the Weinberger and Powell
Doctrines—in defence of less-than-vital national interests. The purpose of the
Weinberger – Powell Doctrine was to create a fundamental mechanism to
avoid an unconsidered rush into another Vietnam-type conflict, which the US
military proved unsuited and/or unable to prosecute to a successful
conclusion. The memory of the painful humiliation suffered by the American
armed forces in Vietnam, particularly by the army, might seem to ensure that
these strategic adventures would never be repeated, especially with a
reinforcing checklist doctrine issued by the Secretary of Defense to safeguard
against it. However, the promise of swift and easy military victories described
in Ullman’s ‘Rapid Dominance’ theory of warfighting overcame all these
cautions. Further, the theory exacerbated a gross imbalance in the staff,
resources and capabilities between a burgeoning Defense Department on the
one hand, and a static and short-handed State Department, on the other
hand. In this context, the militarisation of US foreign policy described by
Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist Dana Priest was inevitable.24
This militarisation of the USA’s international relations was expressed most
starkly by the use of the US ground forces, the army in particular, as the
leading ‘instrument of policy’ in reordering the political structure of the
Middle East. It is questionable whether US ground forces are suited to
conduct the sort of ‘small war’ that the insurgency (or civil war) in Iraq has
become. A small war is defined by the strategist Carnes Lord in terms of the
pre-eminence of political considerations in its prosecution.25 Because of the
use of the term ‘small’, the issue of scale can be misleading. The wars in El
Salvador, Colombia, the Philippines and Afghanistan are small by calculus of
their numbers—but the conflicts in Korea and Vietnam and now Iraq, despite
the hundreds of thousands of American troops engaged, were and are
ultimately small wars as well.
Throughout the Cold War the US Army’s real focus was on preparing to
fight World War Three in Europe. Since 2000 the priority of the former
Defense Secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, was for the military to concentrate on
the ‘transformation’ of its services to fight rapid, decisive expeditions in
preference to long, grinding counterinsurgencies. In 1965 French author and
journalist Bernard Fall assessed the 20th century to be the ‘century of small
wars’. He noted that ‘big wars’—that is, the two world wars—were actually
aberrations, as would be a major war between the USA and China.26 But a
large-scale conventional war with China is the kind of war the US Army
seeks to fight. Writer and analyst Robert Kaplan has drawn attention to the
Pentagon’s plans for new fleets of super-destroyers, cruise missiles, stealth
fighters and air-transportable mini-tanks to counter the supposed coming
threat of China. If the USA wants to impress China, he countered, then it
needs to succeed in Iraq.27
The military’s transition from the ‘shock and awe’ approach to warfare to
dealing with the conflict and instability associated with insurgents and
guerrilla fighters was impeded by the ban on the word ‘guerrillas’ by then
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Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld. It is a useful term, although the combatants
so labelled have been underestimated before. In 1962, on the cusp of the
large-scale US commitment to the Vietnam war, the well decorated Chief of
Staff of the US Army and World War Two veteran, General George Decker,
dismissively asserted: ‘Any good soldier can handle guerrillas’.28
Combat against insurgents (or ‘guerrillas’) in Iraq reveals all the
contradictions in the US Army and, in a similar way, the Marines.
Counterinsurgency operations are small, both relatively and absolutely. In
the Greek Civil War, the Hukbalahap rebellion in the Philippines, the hunt
for Ernesto Ché Guevara in Bolivia, and the civil war in El Salvador, the
‘unit of action’ was actually individuals. In all cases it was ultimately single
advisors, defense attachés and small teams of specialists who had influence
out of all proportion to their small numbers. The classic army, in contrast,
embraces mass. Its framework components for operations are brigades,
divisions and corps—units of thousands. Exacerbating this oversized
organisation is officers’ excessive study of the Civil War and World War
Two, which showcase these large units. The army is fixated on what soldier-
scholar John Waghelstein calls ‘the sine curve of mobilization, world war,
then de-mobilization’.29
In terms of time, counterinsurgency operations are slow and patient. Its
practitioners accept the necessity of long-term social changes essential to
eliminate conditions that fuel anti-government sentiment and violence. Yet
the classic army strives for speed, tactically, operationally and strategically.
In 1862 President Abraham Lincoln issued General Orders 100, also known
as the Lieber Code, which is the basis of the present US Law of Land
Warfare. GO 100 introduced the premise of a ‘short, sharp war’ as being
more humane and less destructive than a long war which might be more
careful of property and the lives of non-combatants.30 This approach plays to
US technological, industrial and logistical strengths, combining with mass to
create inertia, and reinforcing the conventional combat leader’s value of
‘offensive-mindedness’.
To prosecute a counterinsurgency, a nation-state requires allies of all
stripes. This is especially true in the 21st century, with the need for the
legitimacy bestowed by the approval of the UN in order to garner support
from global public opinion. Despite this, or perhaps because of it, the classic
army prefers to fight alone. Allies slow them down, and complicate the
planning and conduct of operations. It doesn’t help that, with the end of the
Cold War, European military budgets have been slashed, and now their
forces’ technologies and expertise lag behind the well funded US services.
Only the miniscule European special operations units integrate readily into
US military commands.
Counterinsurgency operations are decentralised, with authority as well as
responsibility devolving to the lowest level of command. They are not a single
war, but a hundred different wars, each unique to its valley, village, district or
neighbourhood. In Iraq the most effective unit commanders decentralised
their units. One lieutenant colonel said, ‘I delegate authority until I feel
uncomfortable, and then I know I’ve got it about right’.31 In these units, for
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the first time, the captains commanding companies have their own staffs—
notably intelligence officers and analysts, drawn from higher headquarters
that were designed to fight against Soviet tank armies instead of handfuls of
terrorists and fanatics hiding among the population they are charged to
protect. The classic army, unfortunately, remains supremely centralised and
hierarchical. Its intelligence architecture is still rooted in the Cold War, where
information is collected and analysed at the highest level, with the lower
echelons ‘informed’ as necessary. The best example of successful decentra-
lised operations in an insurgent environment might be the Viet Cong, who
developed the ‘dau tranh’ concept. This operational model balanced central
objectives, strategy and doctrine with decentralised execution determined by
local commanders, who tuned their activities to local conditions. A key
element of dau tranh was, of course, an attitude of patience.32
The classic army, then, is focused on the next big war, rather than the small
war at hand. So the US Army today is divided, like the Soviet Red Army
during their war in Afghanistan. The Russian Eighth Guards Army stationed
in East Germany anticipated the big war against the USA and its NATO allies,
which never came. This attitude was in contrast to the so-called ‘Afghanistan
Club’ of Russian units fighting their ‘small war at hand’. Like the Soviets in
Afghanistan, the US forces in Vietnam never lost any battles of
significance—but they lost the war. Also the Soviets and the Americans
finally figured out how to best prosecute the war, but in both cases, when
they did, it was too late to reverse the inertia towards defeat. The Soviet loss
of Afghanistan precipitated the loss of Soviet credibility in the global foreign
policy arena—just as the USA suffered for a decade after its defeat in the
Vietnam war.
The strategist Edward Luttwak wrote an essay in 1983 called ‘Notes on
low-intensity warfare’. Although the term has since fallen from proper
doctrinal usage, his thesis exposed the fact that the US military had
oversimplified its understanding of the so-called ‘Weinberger’ and later
‘Powell’ Doctrines. These doctrines presumed, first, that complete public
support of a war is necessary for its commencement and, second, that a vital
national interest must be at stake to go to war. However, the first tenet
assumes there is no link to the manner in which a war is fought, only to the
decision to fight it. Luttwak contended, ‘Public support cannot be demanded
up front; it must be earned’.33 This thesis is being validated today in Iraq.
The second supposition forgets that the nature of US global engagement
requires protection of merely ‘important’ and ‘other’ interests, not just the
lives of the citizens and the territory and of the USA. Career diplomat
George Kennan appears to have been right in recognising that the ‘American
way of life’, which is absolutely dependent on global business and
international partners, is a vital interest.34
The central issue, Luttwak argues, is the army’s ability to comprehend that
counterinsurgency is tied to the army’s self-regard. The classic army inflicts
casualties by overwhelming firepower, speed and mass—so it focuses
internally to optimise its administration of material and personnel resources
to achieve maximum efficiency. The clue to this attitude is the incessant use of
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football metaphors by military leaders, referring to a sport that is all about
power and speed. This ‘inwardly-regarding’ attitude ignores any given enemy
and the setting and context of the conflict, fairly in accordance with the mass-
reliant Soviet Army’s World War Two maxim: ‘Quantity is quality’.35 The
critical flaw in this notion is that it assumes all opponents can be beaten with
mass and power and speed. This is not so. In Iraq the firepower-delivery units
of the army are finding their targets becoming less and less defined, and more
and more dispersed. Despite all historical evidence available before the
invasion of Iraq, however, the doctrine of ‘shock and awe’ embraced the
opinion that firepower will always win.
What is necessary for small wars such as counterinsurgencies, says
Luttwak, is an ‘outwardly-regarding’ force that can find enemy weaknesses,
then organise itself to exploit those weaknesses. Further, a large army has a
large internal bureaucracy, which is inherently inflexible in any fundamental
way, and resistant to adaptation above the level of its smaller tactical units.36
So ‘joint operations’ doesn’t mean the selection of the most appropriate units
for a given mission, but the inclusion of all services and all units, with all their
platforms and weapons systems—a reflex known among officers as the kids’
soccer league syndrome—‘everyone gets to play’. Contrary to the need for
squads and platoons of soldiers to disperse among the local populations,
classic army logistics and ‘force protection’ issues drive senior commanders
and staffs to consolidate their units in centralised bases. This eases internal
organisational functioning, without concern for the situation in Iraq—
ignoring the actual reason for being in Iraq.
There are related problems for the army as it confronts the challenge of
counterinsurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan. The classic army treats all wars
the same, and sees them only as scaled differently—yet all small wars are
unique and different. The classic army rotates personnel frequently and
widely, because it views all personnel as interchangeable—yet small wars
require hard-to-learn expertise in a given region, with language and cultural
skills, and key personal contacts taking years to acquire. The classic army
eschews ‘politics and policy’ as beyond their purview, claiming to be
apolitical—but small wars require manipulation of local politics to overcome
opponents without having to defeat them in combat. Out-and-out military
defeat of an insurgency will not be possible in most conflicts. The classic army
is focused on firepower and logistics. In early 2006 the Washington Times
published a letter from a marine corporal serving in the infantry in Iraq’s Al
Anbar province, describing his foxhole-level perspective on combat there. He
offered the key to defeating the insurgents in Iraq: ‘We need bigger caliber
weapons’.37 The half-inch-diameter slug from the 50-calibre heavy machine
gun in service in Iraq is as big as they come, but it isn’t helping the Rakkasans
in Samarra.
Small wars can’t be won by the firepower of ‘shock and awe’. Despite
the Pentagon’s terribly flawed initial effort at fighting the Iraqi insurgency,
the 2005 Counterinsurgency Survey ordered by General George Casey, the
senior coalition commander in Iraq, showed that elements of the so-called
classic army were able to adapt, in notable measure, to the exigencies of the
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war. This was especially the case with the younger and more junior military
leadership: the sergeants, lieutenants and captains.38 Serious steps are being
taken to educate the officers and troops deploying to Iraq about how to fight
this kind of small war against an unconventional enemy. At the National
Training Center in Death Valley in Southern California, tank battle scenarios
have been set aside to provide simulations of day-to-day activities in Iraqi
towns, with over 299 Iraqi Americans (hired through the Screen Actors
Guild) playing roles as sheikhs, mayors, businessmen, criminals and
terrorists. North of Baghdad at Taji, a ‘Counterinsurgency Academy’
instructs US officers as they arrive on the most up-to-date information they
need to survive and perform their mission, in their assigned zone of
operations. One of the academy instructors recently advised that, at this stage
of the war, no American will ever be able to win the ‘hearts and minds’ of the
Iraqis they are responsible to protect—but they might earn their respect.39
Conclusion: from ‘shock and awe’ to ‘hearts and minds’
Even assuming the classic Big Army could become a New Model Army,
capable of successfully engaging in the next century of small wars, there
remain questions of national policy, its implementation and its costs.
Patience is not widely held as an American virtue. The theory of Rapid
Dominance and its brutal adjunct ‘shock and awe’ appealed to this aggressive
streak, and must have ‘briefed well’ in front of the Pentagon staffs. Yet, in its
only real-world test, the theory failed so suddenly and completely that its
author immediately criticised his own disciples for not implementing his
concept properly, while telling journalists ‘shock and awe’ was just an
informal, unofficial straw-man. As the coalition tank columns approached
Baghdad, Harlan Ullman quietly removed the phrase ‘father of the doctrine
of ‘‘Shock and Awe’’’ from his biography on his personal website.40 In the
21st century, even ‘short, sharp wars’ may still be measured in years. Even if
the army disciplines itself to fight long wars, it is not certain the US political
process will allow it to. The champion football coach Vince Lombardi once
explained, ‘I never lost a game, I just ran out of time’. In Iraq and in future
small wars, the timeline of American political will may matter more than any
capacity its soldiers have to master the ability to win ‘hearts and minds’ to
their cause.
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